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  In this paper, I will argue that semantic holism is, inherently, a false claim. Semantic 
holism, here, being defined as the meaning of a word or expression in a given language (λ) is 
constructed by  its relation to other words and expressions in said given language (λ) and its 
role in said given language (λ). The following premises support the refutability of semantic 
holism. The first  premise being linguistic relativity, here defined as any given language (λ) 
contains, exclusively, the words and expressions that  are necessary for completeness in the 
functionality of said given language (λ) so as to provide a full world view to its native 
speaker. The second premise being that the cultural influences, specifically present during the 
development of the given language (λ) and during a native speaker’s acquisition of the given 
language, shape the semantics of the words and expressions per the syntax of a given 
language (λ), restricting the possibility that  the meaning of words or expressions in said given 
language (λ) are defined relative to other words and expressions. The third premise is 
grounded in a form of linguistic determinism, here defined as the identification of words and 
expressions of given conceptual contexts across different languages (here, across  the 
languages of Spanish and English), which substantiate that any  given language (λ) can 
function and serve the needs of its native speakers without containing equally exact notions, 
being that the form of words and expressions do not need to directly translate in both 
semantics and application. In conclusion, the three preceding premises lead to the coherent 
rejection of semantic holism. 
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  I will now show how linguistic relativity supports the belief that semantic holism is a 
erroneous claim. If linguistic relativity, as defined here, allows that  the native speakers of any 
given language (λ) form and define only the words and expressions that they find essential 
for effective communication and understanding of their beliefs and surroundings, then 
linguistic relativity would guarantee the community  of native speakers of the given language 
(λ) a wholeness of their respective world view. I will now propose two examples that support 
linguistic relativity. Suppose that an isolated community lives on a tropical steppe island with 
a yearly temperature range between 70ºF and 100ºF and approximately 100 centimeters of 
rain. The community that lives on the island speaks the language of τ, which contains words 
for “high temperatures”, “heat wave”, “drought”, “flood”, “heat lightening”, “thunderstorm”, 
“hurricane”, “rain”, “drizzle”, “fog” and “mist”. However, because the community on the 
island has never been exposed to nor has heard of the occurrences of snow, ice, black ice, 
blizzard, snow flurry, hail, haze, ice storm, sleet, and other winter weather happenings, the 
language of τ does not contain equivalent words or expressions. As such, the community of 
native speakers of τ has not formed nor defined the words or expressions that relate to the 
winter weather terms respectively  in English as they  lack the need of such words and 
expressions in their vocabulary in order to have a full world view. Another example in 
support of linguistic relativity  is that of modern technology terminology. Suppose that in the 
year 1800 the words “television”, “satellite”, “computer”, “internet”, “cellular device”, 
“wireless”, “Google”, or “mp3” were mentioned, at a time when telegraphs, typewriters and 
telephones were yet to be invented. Whereas in the nineteenth century, the people did not 
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have the need for nor an understanding of aforementioned terminology, said terms have 
become essential in today’s languages in order for today’s populations to be able to 
effectively communicate information regarding the technology in use. As such, the native 
speakers of the languages of the world that have been involved in the discoveries of 
technology and that have interacted with the new technologies have formed, defined and 
adopted the words and expressions into their respective vocabularies as they found the need 
of such words and expressions in order to maintain a full world view. 
  I will now show how cultural influences further refutes the coherency of semantic 
holism. If cultural influences during a native speaker’s acquisition of the given language (λ) 
shape the semantics of the words and expressions learned through the syntax of the given 
language (λ), then said influences restrict the possibility  that the meaning of words or 
expressions in any given language (λ) are defined relative to other words and expressions in 
the given language (λ), as suggested by the belief of semantic holism. To help  prove this 
premise, the following examples portray the semantics of idioms as dictated by the cultures 
and languages in which they  are respectively used. Consider “curiosity  killed the cat” in the 
English language with the figurative semantics of a warning against unwarranted inquiry  and 
experimentation, as compared to the translation of the expression in Spanish, which literally 
translates to “la curiosidad mató al gato” without the figurative semantics granted by the 
cultural influences of English. Conversely, consider the Spanish idiom “es un arroz con 
mango”, which literally  translated means “it is a rice with mango”, with the figurative 
semantics of a statement of the complexity of the situation, occurrence, or object granted by 
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the cultural influences of Spanish, mainly that rice and mango are two foods that are not 
mixed in a dish as they are seen as dissimilar and non-complementary  in Hispanic tradition. 
In both of the aforementioned example idioms, the cultural influences, namely the social and 
historical influences, surrounding the given language (λ) and surrounding any  native 
speaker’s acquisition of the given language (λ) shape the semantics, albeit figurative in the 
presenting case of idioms, of the the given language (λ). Therefore, the cultural influences 
that surround any given language (λ) lend to the meaning of the words and expressions in 
any  native speaker’s lexicon for his or her given language (λ). Such diminishes the logical 
application of semantic holism to any given language (λ) as it restricts the possibility that the 
semantics of words or expressions in any given language (λ) are formed and defined relative 
to other words and expressions in the given language (λ). 
  Lastly, I will demonstrate how linguistic determinism also supports the refutability  of 
semantic holism. If linguistic determinism allows that words and expressions in any  given 
language (λ) be contained in a set of concepts (α) in a given yet  infinite set of contexts (β), 
which meet the needs of its native speakers, then any two given languages (λ) do not need to 
contain words or expressions that share exactly equivalent semantics and applications 
provided that the words and expressions of the respective languages hold concepts (α) and 
contexts (β) that serve the needs of its respective native speakers. To help  prove the point 
presented in said premise,  please consider the Spanish noun, cariño, and the corresponding 
adjective, cariñoso, which are often translated to mean “affection, care, love”  and 
“affectionate, caring, loving”  in the English language. However, though the aforementioned 
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are words given for their respective translations, the concept of cariño and the quality of 
being cariñoso in the Spanish language, and by extension culture, are inequivalent to the 
words given as counter-words in the English language, and by extension culture. Despite 
said, the English language is not lacking in its ability to convey the near-equivalent concepts 
of cariño and the quality of being cariñoso as native speakers of the English language have 
ways that are well-within their lexicons to express any given concept in an infinite set of 
contexts. As such, the possibility that the semantics of words or expressions in any given 
language (λ) are defined solely as they  relate to the semantics of the other words and 
expressions found in said given language (λ), as suggested by semantic holism, is a false 
notion because any  given language (λ) defines the semantics of its words and expressions 
based on the needs of its native speakers and has words and expressions within its native 
speakers’ lexicons which serve the native speakers in communication and expression. 
  Thus, based on linguistic relativity, the cultural influences on the semantics of any 
given language (λ), and linguistic determinism, semantic holism is found to be an inherently 
false notion. As linguistic relativity suggests that the only words and expressions found in the 
lexicons of native speakers of any given language (λ) is decided by the necessity of said 
words and expressions by the native speakers, the coherency of semantic holism, if defined as 
the meaning of a word or expression in a given language (λ) is constructed by  its relation to 
other words and expressions in said given language (λ) and its role in said given language (λ), 
is deconstructed. Similarly, the cultural influences, particularly the social influences and 
historical influences, and linguistic determinism, defined as any two given languages (λ) do 
not need to contain words or expressions that share exactly equivalent semantics and 
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applications provided that the words and expressions of the respective languages hold 
concepts (α) and contexts (β) that serve the needs of its respective native speakers, support 
the refutability of semantic holism. In conclusion, semantic holism is a refutable claim. 
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